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Abstract
Can households’ inattention to the stock market quantitatively account for the inertia in portfolio 
rebalancing? I address this question by introducing an observation cost into a production 
economy with heterogeneous agents. In this environment inattention changes endogenously 
over time and across agents. I fi nd that inattention explains the inertia in portfolio rebalancing 
and its heterogeneity across households. Inattention also rationalises the limited stock market 
participation observed in the data, and improves the asset pricing performance of the model. 
Finally, I present a novel testable implication linking the effects of inattention on portfolio 
choices and asset prices to households’ funding liquidity.
Keywords: observation cost, limited stock market participation, equity premium.
JEL classifi cation: G11, G12.
Resumen
¿Puede la desatención de los hogares a la bolsa de valores explicar cuantitativamente la inercia 
en el rebalanceo de las carteras? Para abordar esta pregunta, este documento introduce 
un coste de observación en una economía de producción con agentes heterogéneos. En 
este entorno, la desatención cambia de forma endógena en el tiempo y entre los agentes. 
En el análisis cuantitativo, la desatención explica la inercia en el rebalanceo de la cartera 
y su heterogeneidad entre los hogares. La desatención tambien racionaliza la limitada 
participación en el mercado de valores observada en los datos y mejora el rendimiento de 
los precios de los activos del modelo. Por último, se presenta una novedosa implicación 
comprobable que vincula los efectos de la desatención en las elecciones de cartera y los 
precios de los activos a la liquidez de fi nanciación de los hogares.
Palabras clave: coste de observación, participación limitada en el mercado de valores, 
prima de riesgo. 
Códigos JEL: G11, G12.
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1 Introduction
Can households’ limited attention to the stock market quantitatively account
for the inertia in households’ portfolio rebalancing? I address this question
by introducing an observation cost into a production economy with hetero-
geneous agents, idiosyncratic labor income risk, and borrowing constraints.
In this environment inattention changes endogenously over time and across
agents. I discipline the quantitative analysis by calibrating the observation
cost to match the duration of inattention of the median household observed
in the data.
I find that inattention accounts for half of the inertia in portfolio rebal-
ancing and its heterogeneity across stockholders. In the model, as it is in
the data, wealthy stockholders invest much more actively than poor stock-
holders. Inattention also reconciles the amount of limited stock market par-
ticipation observed in the data with a low per-period participation cost. In
addition, I show that inattention improves the asset pricing performance of
the model. Importantly, I highlight a novel testable implication that links
households’ inattention to households’ funding liquidity: inattention matters
quantitatively on the dynamics of portfolio rebalancing and asset prices only
if borrowing constraints are tight enough.
This paper studies the role of households’ inattention by relaxing the
assumption that agents are always aware of the state of the economy. Despite
standard models postulate that households continuously collect information
on the stock market and derive optimal consumption/savings plans, in the
data we observe a different pattern. For example, Ameriks et al. (2003)
show that households plan infrequently, and wealthy agents plan more often
than poor ones. Alvarez et al. (2012) use data from two Italian surveys
and find that the median household pays attention to the stock market every
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3 months. Furthermore, there is a large heterogeneity in inattention across
households: 24% of households observe their financial portfolios less often
than twice per year, while 20% of them do it more often than once per week.
Finally, Rossi (2010), Da et al. (2011), and Sichermann et al. (2016) find
that the allocation of attention comoves with stock returns.1
This evidence has motivated a new strand of the literature, which stud-
ies the implications of households’ limited attention on portfolio choices and
asset prices. Nevertheless, the results are still inconclusive. Gabaix and Laib-
son (2002) and Rossi (2010) show that models with inattention can account
for the lumpiness in portfolio adjustments and the dynamics of asset prices.
Conversely, Chen (2006) and Finocchiaro (2011) find that inattention has
negligible effects on portfolio choices and the level of the equity premium.2
In this paper I evaluate whether the observed duration of households’
inattention can quantitatively account for the inertia in households’ portfo-
lio rebalancing. I build on Reis (2006) and develop a tractable theory of
endogenous inattention with heterogeneity across agents. I propose a model
that introduces an observation cost into the environment of Krusell and Smith
(1997, 1998). Namely, I consider a production economy with incomplete mar-
kets, idiosyncratic labor income risk, and heterogeneous agents, who incur in
an observation cost whenever they collect information on the aggregate states
of the economy and formulate a new plan for financial investment. This fea-
ture generates a novel trade-off: attentive households take better decisions,
but also bear higher costs. As a result, households decide to plan at infre-
quent dates and stay inattentive meanwhile. Inattentive agents do not gather
1Few other papers show that investors’ attention affects stock prices and portfolio choices, e.g. Barber and Odean
(2008), Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), Della Vigna and Pollet (2009), Hirshleifer et al. (2009), and Mondria et al.
(2010).
2Lynch (1996), Duffie (2010), and Chien et al. (2011, 2012) study the implications of exogenous infrequent
portfolio rebalancing on asset prices. In the Supplementary Appendix, I study how the results of the model change
when inattention is considered as either an endogenous variable or an exogenous one.
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new information on the aggregate states of the economy and their financial
portfolios change by inertia following the realizations of stock and bond re-
turns.
When I bring the model to the data, I discipline the role of inattention by
calibrating the observation cost to match the duration of inattention of the
median household estimated by Alvarez et al. (2012). I also discipline the
interaction of inattention with households’ funding liquidity by calibrating
the tightness of the borrowing constraints to match the share of households
with negative wealth. These choices imply that the aim of the paper is not to
use inattention to match portfolio rebalancing and asset prices. Rather, the
model can be used to address the following question: once the observation
cost and the tightness of the borrowing constraints are pinned down by the
data, how much of the dynamics of portfolio rebalancing and asset prices can
be accounted for only by households’ inattention?
Looking at the results of the model, I find that the duration of inatten-
tion depends negatively on households’ wealth - in line with the evidence of
Ameriks et al. (2003) - because observation costs are relatively higher for
poor agents. The cyclicality of inattention depends on the marginal gain and
the marginal cost of being attentive and actively investing in the stock mar-
ket. Both forces are countercyclical, but they asymmetrically affect different
agents. Poor households plan in expansions because they cannot afford the
observation cost in bad times. Instead, wealthy agents plan in recession to
benefit of the higher expected return to equity. Overall the level of inattention
is countercyclical.
Second, households’ portfolio rebalancing displays substantial inertia. As
long as inattentive agents do not invest actively, their financial positions fol-
low passively the realizations of the aggregate shock. On average, households
actively offset around 73% of the passive variations in the risky share. Hence,
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inertia drives 27% of the changes in the financial portfolios. Since in the data
inertia characterizes 50% of the variations in the risky share, as documented
in Calvet et al. (2009), the model can account for 54% of the observed iner-
tia in portfolio rebalancing. In the model, the inertia is entirely determined
by the observation cost. Indeed, when the observation cost is set to zero,
households always actively adjust their financial positions.
The model generates a large heterogeneity in the degree of portfolio re-
balancing across households. Wealthy agents are attentive often enough to
actively rebalance their portfolios period-by-period. Instead, poor stockhold-
ers are very inattentive and offset just 43% of the passive variation in their
portfolios. This result is consistent with the evidence of Calvet et al. (2009),
who find that although on average portfolio rebalancing is rather inertial,
wealthy households invest very actively.
Third, inattention provides a rationale to the limited stock market partic-
ipation. The model can account for the share of market participants observed
in the data with a low per-period participation cost. Without inattention,
matching the same share of stockholders requires a participation cost which
is four times larger. Inattention is a barrier to financial investment because
households anticipate that during the periods of inattention they end up in-
vesting sub-optimally.
Fourth, inattention improves the asset pricing performance of the model.
On the one hand, inattention raises the volatility of stock returns, by boost-
ing the movements in the marginal productivity of capital. As inattentive
agents cannot immediately adjust their portfolios to the realizations of the
aggregate shock, individual financial investment alternates between periods
of inaction and periods of sharp adjustments. As a result, aggregate invest-
ment becomes more volatile and less correlated with the realizations of the
aggregate productivity shock. These two channels raise the volatility of the
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marginal productivity of capital. On the other hand, inattention induces
countercyclical variations in the equity premium. This result is usually ob-
tained through consumption habits or long run risk. Instead, here it is just
the by-product of the observation cost, that concentrates the aggregate risk
on a small measure of agents. As in Chien et al. (2012), at each point of
time there are few attentive investors that actively trade stocks and bear the
whole aggregate risk of the economy, commanding a higher return rate on
equity.
Finally, I provide a novel testable implication that links households’ inat-
tention to households’ funding liquidity. I find that inattention matters quan-
titatively on the dynamics of portfolio rebalancing and asset prices only if bor-
rowing constraints are tight enough. When borrowing constraints are loose,
households can borrow and smooth away any investment mistake made dur-
ing inattention. Moreover, all households participate in the stock market
with buy-and-hold positions, as in Chen (2006). In this case, households di-
lute the observation cost by trading very infrequently, portfolio rebalancing
is passive, and inattention does not affect asset prices.
2 Related Literature
This paper studies households’ inattention to the stock market. In the lit-
erature, inattention is usually achieved either by making agents gathering
information and planning financial investment at discrete dates (e.g., Duffie
and Sun, 1990; Lynch, 1996; Gabaix and Laibson, 2002; Chen, 2006; Reis,
2006; Rossi, 2010; Finocchiaro, 2011; Chien et al., 2011, 2012), or through
learning with capacity constraints (e.g., Sims, 2003; Peng, 2005; Huan and
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Liu, 2007).3 I follow the first strand of the literature because of my emphasis
on the effects of inattention on agents’ portfolio choices. Indeed, I study a
heterogeneous agent economy, in which the individual portfolio choice is not
trivially determined. This feature avoids having a representative agent which
in equilibrium holds the portfolio of the market. Models featuring learning
with capacity constraint can be extended to the case of heterogeneous agents
and idiosyncratic shocks only by neglecting the existence of higher-order be-
liefs, as discussed in Porapakkarm and Young (2008).4 Yet, Angeletos and
La’O (2009) show that higher-order beliefs do play a crucial role in the dis-
semination of information across agents.
My paper differs from the literature on inattention on two main dimen-
sions. First, I discipline the role of inattention by calibrating the observation
cost to match the actual duration of inattention for the median household. In
this way, I can evaluate whether the observed level of inattention can quan-
titatively account for the heterogeneous dynamics in portfolio rebalancing
across households. Second, I highlight a novel testable mechanism that links
inattention - and its quantitative effects on portfolio choices and asset prices
- to the tightness of households’ borrowing constraints.
3 The Model
In the economy there is a representative firm that uses capital and labor to
produce a consumption good. On the other side, there is a unit measure of
ex-ante identical agents. Households are ex-post heterogeneous because they
bear an uninsurable idiosyncratic labor income risk. Moreover, they incur
3Inattention is also closely tied to the concepts of information acquisition, e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and
Peress (2004), and uncertainty, see Veronesi (1999) and Andrei and Hasler (2015).
4When agents have imperfect common knowledge and differ in their information set, they need to forecast other
agents’ forecast, and so on so forth. In this case, equilibrium prices do not depend only on the infinite-dimensional
distribution of agents across wealth, but also on the infinite-dimensional distribution of beliefs.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1633
in a monetary observation cost whenever they collect information on the
aggregate states of the economy and take the optimal decisions on portfolio
choices. Households can invest in three assets: a risk-free bond, risky capital,
and a transaction account that yields no interest payment. The transaction
account is liquid: inattentive households finance consumption expenditure
only using the transaction account.
3.1 The Firm
The production sector of the economy consists of a representative firm, which
produces a consumption good Yt ∈ Y ⊂ R+ using a Cobb-Douglas production
function
Yt = ztN
1−η
t K
η
t (1)
where η ∈ (0, 1) denotes the capital income share. The variable zt ∈ Z ⊂ R+
follows a stationary Markov process with transition probabilities Γz(z
′, z) =
Pr (zt+1 = z
′|zt = z). The firm hires Nt ∈ N ⊂ R+ workers at the wage wt,
and rents from the households the stock of physical capital Kt ∈ K ⊂ R+
at the interest rate rst . Physical capital depreciates at a rate δ ∈ (0, 1)
after production. The firm chooses capital and labor to equate the marginal
productivities to prices, as follows
rst = ηztN
1−η
t K
η−1
t − δ (2)
wt = (1− η)ztN−ηt Kηt . (3)
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3.2 Households
The economy is populated by a measure one of ex-ante identical households.
They are infinitely lived, discount the future at the rate β ∈ (0, 1), and
maximize lifetime utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU (ct) (4)
where ct ∈ C ⊂ R+ denotes consumption at time t. I consider a CRRA utility
function U(c) = c
1−θ
1−θ , where θ denotes the risk aversion of the households.
3.2.1 Idiosyncratic Shocks
Households bear an idiosyncratic labor income risk which consists of two
components. First, households are hit by a shock et ∈ E ⊂ {0, 1}, which
determines their employment status. A household has a job when et = 1 and
is unemployed when et = 0. I assume that et follows a stationary Markov
process with transition probabilities
Γe(z, z
′, e, e′) = Pr
(
et+1 = e
′|et = e, zt = z, zt+1 = z′
)
. (5)
Although the shock is idiosyncratic and washes out in the aggregate, its
transition probabilities depend on the aggregate productivity shock. In this
way, both the idiosyncratic uncertainty and the unemployment rate of the
economy rise in recessions.5 Second, when a household is employed, it faces
a further shock ξt ∈ Ξ ⊂ R+, which determines the efficiency units of hours
worked. This shock is orthogonal to the aggregate productivity shock and
follows a stationary Markov process with transitional probabilities
Γξ(ξ, ξ
′) = Pr(ξt+1 = ξ′|ξt = ξ). (6)
5Mankiw (1986) and Krueger and Lustig (2010) show that a countercyclical idiosyncratic uncertainty raises the
price of risk. Storesletten et al. (2007) find that in the data labor income risk peaks in recessions.
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When a household is unemployed, it receives a constant unemployment ben-
efit w¯ > 0, which is financed through a lump sum tax τ applied to employed
agents. Households’ labor income lt is then
lt = wtξtet + w¯ (1− et)− τet. (7)
As in Pijoan-Mas (2007), I consider two sources of idiosyncratic uncertainty
just for quantitative reasons. In the calibration of the model, the employment
shock disciplines the correlation between the individual labor income risk and
the aggregate shock, whereas I use the shock to the efficiency units of labor to
match the cross-sectional distribution of labor income observed in the data.
3.2.2 Market Arrangements
Households can allocate their overall wealth ωt ∈ Ω ∈ R between consump-
tion and savings. Households can save in three different ways. First, house-
holds own the capital of the economy. Each household holds st ∈ S ≡ [s,∞]
units of capital, which are either rented to the firm or traded among house-
holds. Capital is risky and yields the rate rst , as defined in (2). Second, house-
holds can also invest in a one-period non-contingent bond bt ∈ B ≡ [b,∞],
which is in zero net supply. The bond yields a risk-free rate rbt . Households
face exogenous borrowing constraints for both assets and cannot go shorter
than s in risky equity and b in risk-free bonds. When these values equal zero,
households cannot take short positions at all. Third, as in Abel et al. (2007,
2013), households can also save in a transaction account at ∈ A ≡ [0,∞].
The transaction account yields no interest payment.6
In addition, households incur in a fixed per-period participation cost φ
whenever investing in the stock market, that is, whenever st = 0. This cost
6In equilibrium households save in the transaction account only if the observation cost is positive. The only
rationale of this account is to provide liquid funds to inattentive households for financing their consumption.
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may prevent households from investing in the stocks. In the quantitative
analysis, I use this cost to match the observed amount of limited stock market
participation, and evaluate to what extent inattention can reconcile a large
share of non-participants with a low per-period participation cost.
In this framework, markets are incomplete because households cannot
trade claims which are contingent on the realizations of the idiosyncratic
shock. As long as the labor income risk cannot be fully insured, households
are ex post heterogeneous in wealth, consumption, and portfolio choices.
3.2.3 Observation Cost
Households incur in a monetary observation cost proportional to their labor
income χlt whenever they acquire information on the aggregate states of the
economy and define their optimal choices on stocks and bonds. This cost is
a reduced form for the financial and time opportunity expenditures bore by
households to figure out the optimal composition of the financial portfolio.
The observation cost induces the households to plan infrequently and stay
inattentive meanwhile. Planning dates are defined as dates di ∈ D ⊂ N such
that di+1 ≥ di for any i. At a planning date di, households pay the cost χldi ,
collect the information on the aggregate states of the economy, and decide
the next planning date di+1. Moreover, households decide the stream of con-
sumption throughout the period of inattention
[
c (ei, ξi) , c
(
edi+1−1, ξdi+1−1
)]
,
and the investment in the transaction account adi+1, risky capital sdi+1, and
risk-free bonds bdi+1. Importantly, the stream of consumption throughout the
period of inattention is set conditional on the realizations of the idiosyncratic
shocks et and ξt. Instead, at non planning dates, households are inatten-
tive and follow the pre-determined plan for consumption set in the previous
planning date. I assume that inattentive households finance consumption
using the transaction account and the stream of labor income. Throughout
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inattention, interest payments rst and r
b
t are reinvested in equity and bonds,
respectively.
In the model, attentive households observe all the states of the econ-
omy, while inattentive households have a limited amount of information. I
assume that inattentive households do not observe the aggregate states of
the economy, although they are always fully aware of the realizations of the
idiosyncratic shocks et and ξt. In the benchmark economy, I assume that
throughout inattention only the choice of consumption - and not the choices
on the composition of the financial portfolio - depends on the realizations of
the idiosyncratic shocks. This assumption is consistent with the empirical
evidence of Alvarez et al. (2012), who find that just 6% of the households
adjust their portfolio more often than they observe it.7
I further characterize the conditions governing inattention in the model.
To maintain the existence of credit imperfections, I postulate that inattention
breaks out exogenously whenever households hit the borrowing constraints.
In such a case, an unmodeled financial intermediary calls the attention of the
households, which pay the observation cost and become attentive. Moreover,
I assume that households become attentive when their consumption plan
cannot be financed anymore by the transaction account and the labor income.
These assumptions affect the realized duration of inattention. A household
that at time di decides not to observe the states of the economy until di+1
ceases to be inattentive at the realized new planning date λ (di+1), which is
the minimum between the desired new planning date di+1 and the periods
in which either the household hits the borrowing constraint,
{
j ∈ [di, di+1) :
bj+1 < b or sj+1 < s
}
, or consumption cannot be financed anymore by the
liquid funds, {j ∈ [di, di+1) : cj > aj + lj}.
7The Supplementary Appendix relaxes this assumption, by considering a version of the model in which during
inattention also the choices of bonds and stocks depend on the realizations of the idiosyncratic shocks.
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3.2.4 Value Function
To define the aggregate states of the households’ problem, I introduce the
distribution of the agents γt - defined over households’ idiosyncratic states,
the decisions of inattention, the portfolio choices, and the consumption path
{ωt, et, ξt, dt, at, bt, ct} - which characterizes the probability measure on the
σ-algebra generated by the Borel set J ≡ Ω×E×Ξ×D×A× S×B×C.
Roughly speaking, γt keeps track of all the heterogeneity among agents. In
this environment γt is an aggregate state. Indeed, Krusell and Smith (1997,
1998) show that prices depend on the entire distribution of agents across their
idiosyncratic states. The distribution γt evolves over time following a law of
motion
γt+1 = H
(
γt, zt, zt+1
)
. (8)
The operator H(·) pins down the changes in the measure γt taking as given
an initial value and the realizations of the aggregate shock zt.
The structure of the problem takes also into account how the informa-
tion is revealed to the agents. The state variables of this economy xt ≡
{ωt, et, ξt; zt, γt} are random variable defined on a filtered probability space
(X,F, P ). X denotes the set including all the possible realizations of xt, F
is the filtration {Ft, t ≥ 0} consisting of the σ-algebra that controls how the
information on the states of the economy is disclosed to the agents, and P
is the probability measure defined on F . Hereafter, I define the expectation
of a variable vt conditional on the information set at time k as Ek [vt] =∫
vtdP (Fk) =
∫
v (xt) dP (Fk). The state vector P
(
vt
∣∣Fk) = P (vt∣∣xk) is a
sufficient statistics for the probability of any variable vt because of the Markov
structure of xt.
The presence of observation costs and inattentive agents implies some
measurability constraints on the expectations of the households. Namely,
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a planning date di defines a new filtration Fs such that Fs = Fdi for s ∈
[di, λ (di+1)). Hence, any decision made throughout the duration of inatten-
tion is conditional on the information at time di, because households do not
update their information on the aggregate states of the economy until the new
planning date λ (di+1). Taking into account this measurability constraint, I
write agents’ recursive problem as
V (ωt, et, ξt; zt, γt) = max
d, [c(et,ξt), c(eλ(d)−1,ξλ(d)−1)], at+1, st+1, bt+1
Et
[
λ(d)∑
j=t
βj−t U (c (ej, ξj))
· · ·+ βλ(d)−t V (ωλ(d), eλ(d), ξλ(d); zλ(d), γλ(d))
]
(9)
s.t. ωt = c (et, ξt) + at+1 + st+1 + bt+1 + φI{st+1 =0} (10)
ωλ(d) = st+1
λ(d)∏
j=t+1
(
1 + rsj (zj, γj)
)
+ bt+1
λ(d)∏
j=t+1
(
1 + rbj (zj, γj)
)
+ at+1 + . . .
+
λ(d)∑
j=t+1
lj (zj, γj)−
λ(d)−1∑
j=t+1
c (ej, ξj)−
λ(d)−1∑
j=t+2
φI{sj =0} − χlλ(d)
(
zλ(d), γλ(d)
)
(11)
γλ(d) = H
(
γt, z
λ(d)
)
(12)
st+1 ≥ s, bt+1 ≥ b, at+1 ≥ 0, c (et, ξt) ≥ 0 (13)
λ(d) = min
j∈[t+1,d]
{
d, bt+1
j∏
k=t+1
[
1 + rbk (zk, γk)
]
< b, st+1
j∏
k=t+1
[1 + rsk (zk, γk)] < s,
. . .
j∑
k=t+1
c (ek, ξk) > at+1 +
j∑
k=t+1
lk (zk, γk)
}
. (14)
Equation (10) denotes the budget constraint of the agents, who use their
wealth to consume, invest in the two assets, save in the transaction account,
and pay the participation cost in case they own stocks. Equation (11) shows
the evolution over time of wealth, which depends on the consumption stream
and the returns to investment throughout inattention. At the realized new
planning date λ(d) agents incur in the observation cost χlλ(d). Equation (12)
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defines the law of motion of the distribution of agents γt conditional on the
history of aggregate shocks zλ(d). Finally, Equation (13) denotes the borrow-
ing constraints faced by the households, whereas Equation (14) describes the
new realized planning date λ(d).
3.3 Equilibrium
3.3.1 Definition of Equilibrium.
A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a value function V , a set of
policy functions
{
gc, gb, gs, ga, gd
}
, a set of prices
{
rb, rs, w
}
, and a law of
motion H(·) for the measure of agents γ such that
• Given the prices {rb, rs, w}, the law of motion H(·), the exogenous tran-
sition matrices
{
Γz,Γe,Γξ
}
, the value function V , and the set of policy
functions
{
gc, gb, gs, ga, gd
}
solve the household’s problem;
• The bonds market clears, ∫ gbdγ = 0;
• The capital market clears, ∫ gsdγ = K ′;
• The labor market clears, ∫ eξdγ = N ;
• The unemployment benefit is financed by a lump sum tax on employed
households,
∫
w¯ (1− e) dγ = ∫ τedγ;
• The law of motionH(·) is generated by the optimal decisions {gc, gb, gs, ga, gd},
the transition matrices
{
Γz,Γe,Γξ
}
, and the history of aggregate shocks
z.
3.3.2 First-Order Conditions.
Gabaix and Laibson (2002) consider an environment in which agents are
exogenously inattentive for a fixed number of periods. In their model, the
Euler equation for consumption holds only for the mass of attentive agents
because inattentive households are off their equilibrium condition. Instead,
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here the Euler equations of both attentive and inattentive agents hold in
equilibrium. At a planning date t the Euler equation is a standard stochastic
inter-temporal condition that reads
Et
[
Mλ(d),t
λ(d)∏
k=t+1
(
rsk (zk, γk)− rbk (zk, γk)
)]
= 0 (15)
where Mλ(d),t = β
λ(d)−t U ′(cλ(d))
U ′(ct) denotes households’ stochastic discount fac-
tor. This condition posits that the optimal share of stocks in the portfolio
equalizes the compounded expected discounted returns from stocks and bonds
throughout the period of inattention.
The Euler equation of an inattentive agent between time v and q, with
t < v < q < λ is deterministic and equals
Mq,v
q∏
k=v+1
(
rsk (zk, γk)− rbk (zk, γk)
)
= 0. (16)
Inattentive agents do not gather any new information on the states of the
economy, and therefore they behave as if there were no uncertainty. Agents
get back to the stochastic inter-temporal conditions as soon as they reach
a new planning date and update their information set. As agents alternate
between attention and inattention, they also shift from stochastic to deter-
ministic Euler equations.8
3.4 Inattention in the Model and in the Data
In the model inattentive households do not observe the aggregate states of
the economy, whereas they are always fully aware of the realizations of the
idiosyncratic shocks et and ξt. The model represents a tractable extension
to the case of heterogeneous agents of the inattentiveness proposed by Reis
8In either case, the Euler equations are not satisfied with equality for borrowing constrained agents.
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(2006). Although in Reis (2006) inattentive agents do not receive any flow
of information, I relax this condition by allowing inattentive households to
observe at least their idiosyncratic sources of uncertainty. From this point of
view, this model bridges the gap between the inattentiveness of Reis (2006)
and the rational inattention of Sims (2003). In Sims (2003), households
choose how to allocate their limited capacity of information acquisition, by
deciding the noise up to which they observe all the relevant variables of
the economy. My model can be considered a limiting case of Sims (2003),
in which households decide to allocate their entire capacity to observe the
idiosyncratic shocks, up to the point that the noise around the idiosyncratic
shocks disappears, while the noise on the aggregate states goes to infinity.
The definition of inattention of the model slightly differs from the defini-
tion of inattention of the survey studied by Alvarez et al. (2012). In their
data, inattention refers to the frequency with which households observe their
financial portfolio. Instead, the model considers a broader definition of inat-
tention, by focusing on the frequency of observation of the aggregate states
of the economy.
Furthermore, in the model households always adjust their portfolios upon
paying the observation cost. Although this is not always the case in the data,
the correlation between observing and adjusting the financial portfolio is very
high and equals 0.45. Alvarez et al. (2012) show that such a correlation can
be rationalized with the presence of both observation costs and portfolio
transaction costs. Since I study an economy in which households do not
face the additional friction of the transaction cost, my model implies a lower
bound on the effects of inattention on portfolio inertia and asset prices.9
9I abstract from the portfolio transaction costs for purely computational reasons. The introduction of portfolio
transaction costs requires the addition of yet another state variable, which would limit substantially the computa-
tional tractability of the model. For instance, following the choices I made in the calibration exercise, this further
state variable would inflate the grid points from 5,184,000 up to 311,040,000.
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4 Calibration
The calibration strategy follows Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998) and Pijoan-
Mas (2007). Some parameters are calibrated to match salient facts of the
U.S. economy, while others (e.g., the risk aversion of the household) are set
to values estimated in the literature. Throughout the quantitative analysis,
I set one period of the model to correspond to one month. Nevertheless, I
report the asset pricing statistics aggregated at the annual frequency to be
consistent with the literature.
First of all, I calibrate the aggregate shock to match the volatility of output
growth. The idiosyncratic labor income risk is defined to target the cross-
sectional distribution of labor income, and its correlation with the aggregate
unemployment rate. It is important to have a realistic variation in labor
income because the choice of inattention, and consequently the effect of the
observation cost on portfolio rebalancing and asset prices, depends on the
budget of the households. The observation cost is defined to replicate the
duration of inattention of the median household, while the participation cost
is set to match the share of stockholders observed in the data. Finally, I
calibrate three parameters that capture the amount of wealth in the economy:
the time discount factor β and the borrowing constraint on stocks s and bonds
b. The discount factor is set to match the U.S. annual capital to output ratio
of 2.5, which yields a value of β = 0.9951. The calibration of the borrowing
constraint is very important because I show that the quantitative implications
of inattention depends crucially on how tighten borrowing constraints are.
First, I equalize the level of the constraint on stocks and bonds, that is, s = b.
Second, I pin down the level of both constraints by matching the fraction of
households with negative wealth, which in the data is around 10%, as shown
in Diaz-Gimenez et al. (2011). This choice implies a value of s = b = −5.96,
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which is equivalent to around three times the monthly income of the median
household.
The parameters set to values estimated in the literature are the capital
share of the production function η, the capital depreciation rate δ, and the risk
aversion of the household θ. I choose a capital share η = 0.40, as suggested
by Cooley and Prescott (1995). The depreciation rate equals δ = 0.0066 to
match a 2% quarterly depreciation. The risk aversion of the household is
θ = 5, which gives an inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of 0.2.
4.1 Aggregate Productivity Shock
I assume that the aggregate productivity shock zt follows a two-state first-
order Markov chain, with values zg and zb denoting the realizations in good
and bad times, respectively. The two parameters of the transition function
are calibrated targeting a duration of 2.5 quarters for both states. The values
zg and zb are instead defined to match the standard deviation of the Hodrick-
Prescott filtered quarterly aggregate output, which is 1.89% in the data.
These values are model dependent, and vary with the specification of the
environment.
4.2 Idiosyncratic Labor Income Shock
Employment Status. The employment shock et follows a two-state first-
order Markov chain, which requires the calibration of ten parameters that
define four transition matrices two by two. I consider the ten targets of
Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998). I first define four conditions that create a
one-to-one mapping between the state of the aggregate shock and the level of
unemployment: regardless of the previous realizations of the shock, the good
productivity shock zg comes always with an unemployment rate ug, and the
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bad productivity shock zb with an unemployment rate ub. In this way, the
realization of the aggregate shock pins down the unemployment rate of the
economy. The four conditions are
1− ug = ugΓe (zg, zg, 0, 1) + (1− ug) Γe (zg, zg, 1, 1)
1− ug = ubΓe (zb, zg, 0, 1) + (1− ub) Γe (zb, zg, 1, 1)
1− ub = ugΓe (zg, zb, 0, 1) + (1− ug) Γe (zg, zb, 1, 1)
1− ub = ubΓe (zb, zb, 0, 1) + (1− ub) Γe (zb, zb, 1, 1) .
The levels of the unemployment rate in good time and bad time are defined
to match the actual average and standard deviation of the unemployment
rate. Using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics from 1948 to 2012, I
obtain that the two moments equal 5.67% and 1.68%, respectively. Under the
assumption that the unemployment rate fluctuates symmetrically around its
mean, I find ug = 0.0402 and ub = 0.0732. Two further conditions come by
matching the expected duration of unemployment in good times (6 months)
and bad times (10 months). Finally, I set both the job finding probability
when moving from the good state to the bad one and the probability of losing
the job in the transition from the bad state to the good one to zero.
Unemployment Benefit. I set the monthly unemployment benefit w¯ to be
5% of the average monthly labor earning. Although different values of the
benefit affect the lower end of the wealth distribution, they have no sizable
effect on the dynamics of portfolio rebalancing and asset prices.
Efficiency Units of Hour. The shock to the efficiency unit of hour ξt
follows a three-state first-order Markov chain. The values of the shock and the
transition function are calibrated to match three facts on the cross-sectional
dispersion of labor earnings across households: the share of labor earnings
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held by the top 20%, the share of labor earnings held by the bottom 40%, and
the Gini coefficient of labor earnings. Table 1 reports the calibrated values
and the transition function of the shock ξt, while Table 2 compares the three
statistics on the distribution of labor earnings in the data and in the model.
Table 1: Parameters of the shock to the efficiency units of hour
ξ1 = 6 ξ2 = 2 ξ3 = 1
Γξ (ξ1, ·) Γξ (ξ2, ·) Γξ (ξ3, ·)
Γξ (·, ξ1) 0.9850 0.0025 0.0050
Γξ (·, ξ2) 0.0100 0.9850 0.0100
Γξ (·, ξ3) 0.0050 0.0125 0.9850
Note: The efficiency unit of hours ξt follows a first-order
Markov chain with transition function Γξ.
Table 2: The distribution of labor earnings
Target Model Data
Share earnings top 20% 62.1% 63.5%
Share earnings bottom 40% 4.4% 4.2%
Gini index 0.57 0.64
Note: the data is from Dı´az-Gı´menez et al. (2011).
4.3 Participation Cost
I calibrate the fixed per-period participation cost φ to match the amount
of limited stock market participation observed in the data. Favilukis (2013)
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reports that in the U.S. in 2007 the share of stockholders is 59.4%. The
model matches this moment with a participation cost that equals φ = 0.019,
which amounts to 0.8% of households’ monthly labor earnings. For example,
if the average household earns an income of around $3, 000 per month, the
cost equals $24.
4.4 Observation Cost
I discipline the amount of inattention risk in the model by calibrating the ob-
servation cost to match the duration of inattention of the median household.
Alvarez et al. (2012) estimate that the median household observes its port-
folio every 3 months. The model matches this moment with an observation
cost that equals χ = 0.029, which amounts to 2.9% of households’ monthly
labor earnings. For example, if the average household earns an income of
around $3, 000 per month, the cost equals $87.
4.5 Computation of the Model
The computation of heterogeneous agent models with aggregate uncertainty
are cumbersome because the distribution γt, a state of the problem, is an
infinite-dimensional object. I approximate γt using a finite set of moments
of the distribution of aggregate capital Kt - as in Krusell and Smith (1997,
1998), Pijoan-Mas (2007) and Gomes and Michaelides (2008) - and the num-
ber of inattentive agents in the economy in every period ζt. On the one hand,
the approximation using a finite set of moments of aggregate capital Kt can
be interpreted as if the agents of the economy were bounded rational, ignor-
ing higher-order moments of γt. Nevertheless, this class of models generates
almost linear economies, in which it is sufficient to consider just the first mo-
ment of the distribution of capital to have a perfect fit for the approximation.
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On the other hand, inattention adds a further term ζt, which signals active
investors about the degree of the informational frictions in the economy. This
condition adds a further law of motion upon which to converge. The presence
of inattention implies one further complication. The decision of the agents
on the duration of inattention requires the evaluation of their value func-
tion over a wide range of different time horizons. I report the details of the
computational algorithm in the Supplementary Appendix.
5 Results
I compare the results of the benchmark model with three alternative calibra-
tions. In the first one, the observation cost is zero and there is no inatten-
tion. In the second one, the observation cost is more severe and amounts
to χ = 0.058. Finally, I consider an economy in which agents are more
risk averse, with θ = 8. I calibrate each version of the model to match the
volatility of aggregate output growth, the cross-sectional distribution of labor
earnings, the amount of limited stock market participation, the level of ag-
gregate wealth, and the fraction of households with negative wealth. Results
are computed from a simulated path of 3, 000 agents over 10, 000 periods.
5.1 Inattention
The observation cost is calibrated to a 3 months duration of inattention for
the median household. It turns out that such a cost prevents a large fraction
of agents from gathering information on the stock market. Table III shows
that in the model, in any given month, the average fraction of inattentive
agents in the economy equals 44%. Furthermore, Figure 1 shows that there
is a negative correlation between wealth and inattention, in line with the
empirical evidence of Ameriks et al. (2003) and Alvarez et al. (2012).
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Consistently with the data, the model generates a sizable heterogeneity
in the duration of inattention across households. For example, the wealthiest
20% of households observe the aggregate states of the economy every period.
Instead, poor agents cannot afford the observation cost and end up being more
inattentive. In the model, the poorest 20% of households stay inattentive for
9 months on average. These results point out that in the model inattention
behaves both as a time-dependent and a state-dependent rule. Indeed, at
each point of time households set a time-dependent rule, deciding how long to
stay inattentive. Yet, when a household becomes wealthier, it opts for shorter
periods of inattention. Thus, inattention looks as if it were conditional on
wealth.10
Figure 1: Optimal Choice of Inattention
Note: the figure plots the policy function of inattention gd as a function of
wealth ω. The idiosyncratic shocks are set to et = 1 and ξt = 2. The
aggregate shock is zt = zg and the aggregate capital equals its mean.
The dynamics of inattention over the business cycle depend on two forces.
On the one hand, the countercyclical equity premium induces households to
plan in recessions because it is the moment in which the cost of inattention
10Reis (2006) labels this property of inattention as “recursive time-contingency”. See Alvarez et al. (2012) and
Abel et al. (2007, 2013) for further characterizations of the dynamics of inattention over time.
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Table 3: Inattention
Inattention χ = 0.029 χ = 0 χ = 0.058 θ = 8 Data
A. Duration of inattention (months)
Median 3.0 0 3.6 4.0 3.0
Median - good times 2.8 0 3.2 3.7 -
Median - bad times 3.2 0 3.9 4.4 -
75th percentile - good times 1.0 0 1.1 1.2 -
75th percentile - bad times 0.6 0 0.9 0.8 -
25th percentile - good times 6.1 0 6.5 6.7 -
25th percentile - bad times 6.7 0 7.0 7.2 -
B. Fraction of inattentive agents
Median 0.44 0 0.48 0.49 -
Median - good times 0.41 0 0.44 0.47 -
Median - bad times 0.50 0 0.54 0.52 -
Note: the variable χ defines the observation cost and θ is the risk aversion of agents, which equals
5 in the benchmark model. Good times denote the periods in which the aggregate productivity
shock is zt = zg and bad times denote the periods in which the aggregate productivity shock
is zt = zb. The fraction of inattentive agents are reported in percentage values. Data is from
Alvarez et al. (2012).
in terms of foregone financial returns is highest. On the other hand, the
severity of the observation cost fluctuates following households’ wealth. In
recessions, households are poorer and cannot afford the observation cost. The
results show that wealthy agents tend to be attentive in bad times, to profit
from the higher equity premium. For example, in the model the agents at
the 75-th percentile of the wealth distribution are on average inattentive for
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1 month in good times and 0.6 months in bad times. Instead, the direct
cost of inattention affects relatively more poor agents, which prefer to plan
in expansions. The agents at the 25-th percentile of the wealth distribution
are on average inattentive for 6.1 months in good times and 6.7 months
in bad times. Overall, inattention is countercyclical: both the duration of
inattention for the median agent and the fraction of inattentive agents in the
economy rise in recession. The countercyclicality of inattention is consistent
with the empirical evidence of Sichermann et al. (2016), who report that
401(k) retirement account logins fall in bearish markets.
Increasing the size of the observation cost to χ = 0.058 extends the du-
ration of inattention for the median agent up to 3.6 months. Also a risk
aversion of θ = 8 does increase the duration of inattention, which goes up to
4 months. This last result is in line with the evidence provided by Alvarez et
al. (2012), who show that more risk averse investors observe their portfolio
less frequently. This outcome is the net result of two counteracting forces.
Households with a higher risk aversion change their portfolio towards risk-free
bonds, decreasing the need of observing the stock market. At the same time,
more risk averse agents have a stronger desire for consumption smoothing,
which induces them to keep track of their investments more frequently. In the
model, the first channel offsets the second one, implying a longer duration of
inattention for more risk averse agents.
5.2 Stock Market Participation
Favilukis (2013) reports that in 2007 just 59.4% of the households participate
in the stock market. I show that inattention can reconcile this amount of
limited stock market participation with a low per-period participation cost.
Although the model is calibrated to match exactly the participation rate
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observed in the data, the level of the participation cost required to get the
right number of stockholders is endogenous. The amount of this cost is then
informative of the extent in which inattention can rationalize the limited
stock market participation.
Table 4 shows that, in the benchmark economy with a positive observation
cost, the model matches the observed share of stockholders with a participa-
tion cost that amounts to 0.8% of households’ average monthly income. If the
average household earns an income of around $3,000 per month, the cost of
participating in the market for one entire year equals $288. When I abstract
from the observation cost, the model requires a participation cost which is
four times larger: the model matches the same share of participants with a
participation cost that amounts to 3.0% of households’ average monthly in-
come. Following the previous example, in this case the cost of participating
in the market for one entire year rises up to $1,080.
Table 4: Participation to the stock market
Variable χ = 0.029 χ = 0 χ = 0.058 θ = 8 Data
Fraction of Shareholders 59.4% 59.4% 59.4% 59.4% 59.4%
Per-Period Participation Cost 0.8% 3.0% 0.6% 0.7% -
(in terms of avg. monthly labor income)
σ(Δ log cS)
σ(Δ log cNS)
0.86 0.39 0.91 0.98 1.60
Gini Index of Wealth 0.66 0.42 0.69 0.71 0.82
Note: the variable χ defines the observation cost and θ is the risk aversion of agents, which equals 5 in the
benchmark model. All the economies are calibrated to match the share of stock market participants observed
in the data. The ratio σ(Δ log cS)σ(Δ log cNS) compares the standard deviation of the consumption growth of stockholders
σ (Δ log cS) with the standard deviation of consumption growth of non-stockholders σ (Δ log cNS). Data is
from Favilukis (2013), Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) and Dı´az-Gı´menez et al. (2011).
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ogenously, as in Saito (1996), Basak and Cuoco (1998), and Guvenen (2009),
or it is derived endogenously through the presence of trading costs, as in
Gomes and Michaelides (2008). The results of Table 4 show that in my econ-
omy the limited stock market participation is determined by the interaction
between the observation cost and the participation cost. For any given value
of the participation cost, the presence of the observation cost further reduces
the number of households that decide to hold equity. In the model, inatten-
tion is a barrier to financial investment because households anticipate that,
during their inattention periods, they cannot actively manage their portfolios
and end up investing sub-optimally. Hence, the households that opt for long
periods of inattention decide not to participate in the stock market.
Figure 2: Optimal Portfolio Choices
Note: the figure plots the policy functions of investment in risky assets ga
(continuous line) and risk free bonds gb (dashed line) as a function of wealth
ω. The idiosyncratic shocks are set to et = 1 and ξt = 2. The aggregate shock
is zt = zg and the aggregate capital equals its mean.
The model also successfully predicts that stockholders are on average
wealthier than non-stockholders. Figure 2 shows that stockholders tend to
be the wealthiest agents of the economy. For example, the poorest 8% of the
In the literature limited stock market participation is either assumed ex-
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households do not hold any risky capital because they are inattentive very
often.
The model fails in reproducing the higher consumption growth volatility
of stockholders with respect to non-stockholders. In the model, stockholders
turn out to be wealthy agents that are able to self-insure their consumption
stream, experiencing thereby a lower volatility than non-stockholders.
5.3 Portfolio Rebalancing
In this Section, I study to what extent stockholders manage to actively offset
the passive variations in their portfolios. To understand the implications of
inattention on portfolio rebalancing, I take the simulated data of my model
and replicate the regression that Calvet et al. (2009) run on a panel of
Swedish households. In this way I quantify whether - and to what extent -
households’ inattention can account for the dynamics of portfolio rebalancing
observed in the data.
Let me first define the risky share αi,t of the household i at time t as
αi,t =
si,t+1
si,t+1+bi,t+1
, that is, the ratio of risky capital over the sum of risky
capital and risk free bonds. I decompose the variations over time in the risky
share αi,t+1−αi,t in two components: the passive change Pi,t+1 and the active
change Ai,t+1.
Consider a stockholder that at time t invests in stocks si,t+1 and bonds
bi,t+1. In the next period, her positions amount to
(
1 + rst+1
)
si,t+1 stocks and(
1 + rbt+1
)
bi,t+1 bonds. If the stockholder does not adjust the portfolio, the
new risky share equals
αPi,t+1 =
(
1 + rst+1
)
si,t+1(
1 + rst+1
)
si,t+1 +
(
1 + rbt+1
)
bi,t+1
=
(
1 + rst+1
)
αi,t+1(
rst+1 − rbt+1
)
αi,t +
(
1 + rbt+1
) .
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share that is expected in the case stockholders do not rebalance at all their
portfolios.
I define the passive change Pi,t+1 as the change in the risky share for a
stockholder that does not adjust her financial portfolio
Pi,t+1 = α
P
i,t+1 − αi,t.
Then, I define the active change Ai,t+1 as the residual change in the risky
share that is not accounted for by the passive risky share αPi,t+1, that is
Ai,t+1 = αi,t+1 − αPi,t+1.
Ai,t+1 does not capture any mechanic change in the risky share and therefore
quantifies the amount of active rebalancing of a stockholder. This measure
is defined such that the overall change in the risky share is the sum of the
passive and active change
αi,t+1 − αi,t = Ai,t+1 + Pi,t+1.
Following Calvet et al. (2009), I study the dynamics of active and passive
portfolio rebalancing across households by estimating the panel regression
Ai,t+1 = constant+ ψ ∗ Pi,t+1 + μ ∗ αi,t + i,t+1.
The coefficient ψ defines the amount of passive change which is offset by
the active rebalancing of stockholders. Instead, the coefficient μ captures the
dependence of the adjustments in the financial portfolio on the previous share
invested in stocks. A fully passive stockholder would have both ψ = 0 and
μ = 0. I estimate the regressions at the yearly frequency, over a sample of
I refer to the variable αPi,t+1 as the passive risky share, that is, the risky
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about 800 periods. I consider only stockholders that maintain a position in
stocks for at least two consecutive years. The regression is estimated over
a panel of households over a total of around 1,200,000 stockholder-period
observations. To be consistent with Calvet et al. (2009), I compute the
annual risky share and related variables from the simulated data taken from
the last month of each year.
Table 5.3 reports the estimates of the parameter ψ of the regression above
in four different cases: I consider all the years of my simulated data (Panel A),
I consider only the expansionary periods (Panel B), I consider all the years
focusing only on stockholders in the 75th percentile of the wealth distribution
(Panel C), I consider all the years focusing only on stockholders in the 25th
percentile of the wealth distribution (Panel D).
Panel A shows that in the model stockholders actively offset around 73%
of the passive change in their portfolio share. This result implies that inertia
accounts for the remaining 27% of the movements in the financial portfolios.
Since Calvet et al. (2009) find that inertia characterizes 50% of the changes in
the risky share of Swedish households, the model is able to account for 54%
of the inertia in portfolio rebalancing observed in the data. In the model,
the inertia in portfolio rebalancing is entirely driven by inattention. Indeed,
when I shut down the observation cost, households always actively manage
their financial positions.
Panel B shows that the amount of active rebalancing increases during
expansions, going up to 77%. This result is consistent with the evidence of
Calvet et al. (2009), who find that the amount of active rebalancing decreased
in Sweden from 2000 to 2002, a period of bearish stock market. In the model,
stockholders are on average more attentive during expansions, and therefore
the average amount of active rebalancing rises in good times.
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Table 5: Panel Regression of Active and Passive Portfolio Rebalancing
χ = 0.029 χ = 0 χ = 0.058 θ = 8 Data
Active Changei,t+1 = Constant + ψ × Passive Changei,t+1 + μ × Risky Sharei,t +i,t+1
A. All Years
ψˆ (Passive Change) −0.730 −0.997 −0.703 −0.712 −0.504
Adjusted R2 0.70 0.76 0.72 0.71 0.12
B. Expansions
ψˆ (Passive Change) −0.774 −0.998 −0.756 −0.766 −
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.77 0.73 0.70 −
C. All Years - Stockholders in the 75th Percentile of the Wealth Distribution
ψˆ (Passive Change) −0.876 −0.999 −0.868 −0.860 −
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.77 0.71 0.73 −
D. All Years - Stockholders in the 25th Percentile of the Wealth Distribution
ψˆ (Passive Change) −0.425 −0.996 −0.419 −0.406 −
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.80 0.79 0.79 −
Note: the table reports the yearly panel regressions of the active change Ai,t+1 in portfolio
rebalancing on a constant, the passive change Pi,t+1 in portfolio rebalancing and the share of
the portfolio invested in stocks in the previous year αi,t. I consider households that participate
in the stock market over two consecutive years (t and t+1). Passive Change ψˆ is the estimated
amount of passive change which is actively offset by the households by adjusting their portfolios.
The variable χ defines the observation cost and θ is the risk aversion of agents, which equals 5
in the benchmark model. Data is from Calvet et al. (2009).
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and poor stockholders. Panel C shows that wealthy households offset 88%
of the passive change in the risky share. This value is twice as large as the
amount of rebalancing estimated across poor households, which equals 43%.
Again, wealthy stockholders can afford to be attentive often enough to have
a very active management of their portfolios. Instead, poor households end
up being inattentive, and their portfolios follow by inertia the realizations
of stock and bond returns. This result highlights that the model is able
to capture the heterogeneity in the inertia of portfolio rebalancing across
households.
5.4 Asset Pricing Moments
5.4.1 Stock and Bond Returns
Panel A of Table 6 reports the results of the model on the level and the
dynamics of stock returns, bond returns, and the equity premium. First, I
discuss the standard deviations because the observation cost almost doubles
the volatility of stock returns. In the benchmark model the standard devi-
ation of returns is 11.5%, which accounts for around 60% of the volatility
observed in the data, that is 19.3%. Nonetheless, without inattention the
standard deviation would be just 6.3%.
The observation cost boosts the volatility of returns because it alters the
dynamics of the marginal productivity of capital. Since inattentive agents
cannot immediately adjust their portfolios to the realizations of the aggregate
shock, individual financial investment alternates between periods of inaction
and periods of sharp adjustments. The effects of inattention on the marginal
productivity of capital can be understood - and quantified - by looking at
how the observation cost changes the behavior of aggregate investment. In
the model, inattention alters the dynamics of aggregate investment in two
Panel C and D compare the amount of active rebalancing across wealthy
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ways. First, inattention raises the volatility of aggregate investment. In the
economy with the observation costs, the standard deviation of investment at
the quarterly frequency equals 2.5%. Although this value is lower than the
empirical counterpart of 4.5%, when I abstract from inattention the volatility
of investment shrinks even more, down to 1.4%. Second, inattention reduces
the correlation between investment and output. In an economy without the
observation costs, investment moves one-to-one with output: the correlation
equals 0.99. With inattention, the correlation drops to 0.93, closer to the
value of 0.95 observed in the data. The increase in the volatility of investment
and the reduction of the correlation between investment and output raise
the fluctuations of both the marginal productivity of capital and the stock
returns. Absent these changes in investment, inattention would not affect the
volatility of stock returns.
As far as the volatility of the risk-free rate is concerned, I find a standard
deviation of 3.7%, which is lower than its empirical counterpart, that equals
5.4%. Note that standard models usually deliver excessively volatile risk-
free rates. For example, Jermann (1998) and Boldrin et al. (2001) report
a standard deviation between 10% and 20%. The mechanism that prevents
volatility to surge is similar to the one explored by Guvenen (2009). Poor
agents have a strong desire to smooth consumption, and their high demand of
precautionary savings offsets any large movements in bond returns. Although
in Guvenen (2009) the strong desire for consumption smoothing is achieved
by a low elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, here it is the observation
cost that forces the agents to insure against the risk of infrequent planning.
When looking at the level of the equity premium reported in Panel B of
Table 6, I find that the model generates a wedge between stock returns and
bond yields which equals 2.6%. In the economy without the observation cost,
the equity premium is just 0.8%. Hence, in the model households’ inattention
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Table 6: Asset pricing moments
Variable Moment χ = 0.029 χ = 0 χ = 0.058 θ = 8 Data
A. Stock and bond returns
Stock return Mean 4.47 1.91 4.81 5.08 8.11
Std. dev. 11.51 6.31 11.97 12.23 19.30
Risk-free return Mean 1.83 1.10 1.84 1.98 1.94
Std. dev. 3.65 2.62 4.00 4.39 5.44
B. Equity premium
Equity premium Mean 2.64 0.81 2.97 3.10 6.17
Std. dev. 11.35 6.27 11.81 12.02 19.49
Sharpe ratio Mean 0.23 0.13 0.25 0.26 0.32
C. Cyclical dynamics
Stock returns Std. dev. - good times 11.33 6.29 8.45 12.07 -
Std. dev. - bad times 11.70 6.34 8.69 12.44 -
Equity premium Mean - good times 2.48 0.80 2.75 2.83 -
Mean - bad times 2.97 0.82 3.22 3.40 -
Note: the variable χ defines the observation cost and θ is the risk-aversion of agents, which equals 5 in the
benchmark model. All statistics are computed in expectation and reported in annualized percentage values.
Annual returns are defined as the sum of log monthly returns. The equity premium is the ret+1 = E
[
rat+1 − rbt+1
]
.
The Sharpe ratio is defined as the ratio between the equity premium and its standard deviation. Good times
denote the periods in which the aggregate productivity shock is zt = zg and bad times denote the periods in
which the aggregate productivity shock is zt = zb. Data is from Campbell (1999) and Guvenen (2009).
to the stock market accounts for around 30% of the observed level of the
equity premium.
The observation cost raises the equity premium through two channels.
First, as in Guvenen (2009), the limited participation in the stock market
concentrates the entire aggregate risk of the economy on a small measure
of stockholders, who accordingly demand a higher compensation for holding
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equity. Second, inattention exacerbates the curvature of the value function of
the agents. Figures 3 - 4 show that inattention raises the implied risk aver-
sion of the households. Although in an economy without observation costs
households’ value function is rather flat, with inattention the value function
becomes both more concave and more responsive to aggregate conditions. In
this way, inattention amplifies the risk associated to holding stocks, especially
in bad times.
Overall the model falls shorter in accounting for asset prices when com-
pared to other papers that in the literature study the role of inattention. For
instance Chien et al. (2011, 2012) consider a model with inattentive agents
which delivers asset prices moments much closer to the data. Although these
papers follow different calibrations strategies, the main difference with my
paper lies in the modeling of inattention. Chien et al. (2011, 2012) consider
an economy with an exogenous measure of agents which trade at exogenously
fixed intermittent dates. In the Supplementary Appendix, I study a version
of my model with exogenous inattention, in which the duration of inatten-
tion is calibrated to match exactly the cross-sectional duration of inattention
obtained in the economy with observation costs. I find that moving from an
endogenous to an exogenous inattention leads to an overstatement of both
the inertia in portfolio rebalancing and the level of the equity premium. In-
tuitively, when inattention is endogenous, households can choose optimally
when to observe the aggregate states of the economy. As a result, households
have yet another choice for smoothing their consumption stream, which leads
to a more frequent rebalancing of their portfolio and to a lower price of risk.
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Figure 3: Slope of the Value Function - Attentive Economy
Note: the figure plots the slope of agents’ value function as a function of
wealth ω in an economy no observation cost, i.e. χ = 0. Bad times (continuous
line) and good times (dashed line) denote periods in which the aggregate
productivity shock is zt = zb and zt = zg. The idiosyncratic shocks are set to
et = 1 and ξt = 2.
Figure 4: Slope of the Value Function - Inattentive Economy
Note: the figure plots the slope of agents’ value function as a function of
wealth ω. in an economy with observation costs, i.e. χ = 0.029. Bad times
(continuous line) and good times (dashed line) denote periods in which the
aggregate productivity shock is zt = zb and zt = zg. The idiosyncratic shocks
are set to et = 1 and ξt = 2.
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5.4.2 Cyclical Dynamics
Inattention generates countercyclical variations in both the stock returns
volatility and the equity premium, as shown in Panel C of Table 6. Since
the observation cost bites more strongly in recessions, there are very few ac-
tive investors in the economy, which implies that the investment in physical
capital is low and very responsive to the decision of the marginal attentive
stockholder. Instead, when the observation cost goes to zero the volatility
becomes rather acyclical.
Inattention leads to an equity premium which is countercyclical and dis-
plays large variations over the cycle, a result which is usually obtained through
consumption habits (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) or long-run risk (Bansal
and Yaron, 2004). In the model, the equity premium equals 2.48% in good
times and 2.97% in bad times. This result is in line with the empirical ev-
idence on a positive risk-return trade-off. Again, the cyclicality disappears
when I shut down the observation costs.
5.5 The Role of Borrowing Constraints
Chen (2006) considers a Lucas-tree economy where heterogeneous agents face
an observation cost, finding that any household owns stock, the portfolio
rebalancing is mostly passive, and the equity premium is zero. Instead, in
my model there is a vast heterogeneity in the degree of portfolio rebalancing
across households, the equity premium is 2.64%, and the observation cost
reconciles the amount of limited stock market participation observed in the
data with a low participation cost. What is the main feature of the model
that allows households’ inattention to matter quantitatively on the dynamics
of both portfolio rebalancing and asset prices? In this Section, I show a novel
testable mechanism that links households’ inattention to households’ funding
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liquidity. I find that the tightness of the borrowing constraints shapes the
implications of households’ inattention: inattention affects the dynamics of
portfolio rebalancing and asset prices only if borrowing constraints are tight
enough.
In what follows, I compare three economies which differ only for the level
of the borrowing constraints. The first one is the benchmark model, where
the borrowing constraints equal minus three times the monthly income of
the median household. In the second case, I consider an economy in which
agents cannot borrow at all, while in the last case the constraints are loose
and equal minus six times the monthly income of the median household. In
this way, I can identify how the effects of households’ inattention depend on
credit market frictions. Furthermore, I keep constant the participation cost
across the three alternative economies to disentangle the contribution of the
borrowing constraints - and their interaction with inattention - on the stock
market participation decisions of the households.
Panel A of Table 7 reports three moments from the three economies: the
fraction of stockholders, the amount of passive rebalancing that households
offset by actively changing their financial portfolio, and the level of the equity
premium.
Panel A shows that when I consider an environment with very tight bor-
rowing constraints, the fraction of stockholders falls down dramatically to
50.7%. Portfolio rebalancing becomes more active: now the households can
offset 78.9% of the passive change in the risky share. This increase in the ac-
tive management of financial portfolios is mainly due to a composition effect.
The drop in the participation rate implies that the few stockholders of the
economy are very wealthy and can afford to incur in the observation cost very
often. Hence, stockholders manage on average more actively their portfolios.
When I consider loose borrowing constraints, both the share of stock-
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holders and the amount of inertia in portfolio rebalancing rise substantially.
In this economy, the households decide to participate in the stock market
and they dilute the observation cost by trading very infrequently. Anyway,
the loose borrowing constraints allow agents to borrow sufficiently to smooth
away any eventual mistake made throughout inattention. As a result, inat-
tention does not affect the price of risk and the equity premium is zero, as in
Chen (2006).
Table 7: The role of borrowing constraints
Variable Benchmark Tight Constraints Loose Constraints
A. Inattentive economy - χ = 0.029
% Stockholders 59.4 50.7 77.1
ψˆ (Passive Change) −0.730 −0.789 −0.186
Equity premium 2.64 6.31 0.36
B. Attentive economy - χ = 0
% Stockholders 89.8 88.2 91.5
ψˆ (Passive Change) −0.998 −0.989 −0.996
Equity premium 0.81 5.01 0.04
Note: The variable χ defines the observation cost. In the “Benchmark” model, borrowing
constraints on bonds and stocks equal around minus three times the monthly income of the
median households, that is, b = s = −5.96. The “Tight Constraints” model does not allow
short sales in neither stocks nor bonds, that is, s = b = 0. In the “Loose Constraints”
model borrowing constraints on bonds and stocks equal around minus three times the
monthly income of the median households, that is, b = s = −11.92. Passive Change ψˆ
is the estimated amount of passive change which is actively offset by the households by
adjusting their portfolios. The parameter is estimated in a panel regression of the active
change in portfolio rebalancing on the passive change in portfolio rebalancing
ActiveChangei,t+1 = Constant+ ψ ×PassiveChangei,t+1+ μ ×RiskySharei,t+ i,t+1.
Importantly, these differences across economies are not driven only by
the changes in the tightness of the borrowing constraints, because most of
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the action hinges on the interaction between borrowing constraints and the
observation cost. To show this mechanism, I replicate the exercise using
the three economies above without the observation cost. Panel B of Table
7 reports the results. In this case, the differences in the tightness of the
borrowing constraint per se can alter the equity premium, but have no effect
whatsoever on the dynamics of portfolio rebalancing.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies whether households’ inattention to the stock market ex-
plains the inertia in households’ portfolio rebalancing. To answer this ques-
tion, I introduce an observation cost into an otherwise standard production
economy with heterogeneous agents, idiosyncratic labor income risk, and bor-
rowing constraints. In this model inattention changes endogenously over time
and across agents. To discipline the quantitative analysis, I calibrate the ob-
servation cost to match the duration of inattention of the median household
estimated by Alvarez et al. (2012).
The quantitative results show that inattention accounts for half of the
inertia in portfolio rebalancing, and explains its heterogeneity across house-
holds. In the model, as it is in the data, wealthy households invest much more
actively than poor households. Moreover, inattention can rationalize the lim-
ited stock market participation observed in the data, and improves the asset
pricing performance of the model. Finally, I highlight a novel testable im-
plication that links households’ inattention to households’ funding liquidity:
inattention matters quantitatively on the dynamics of portfolio rebalancing
and asset prices only if borrowing constraints are tight enough.
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A.1 Computation of the Model
This Section describes the computational algorithm I used to numerically solve the model.
The algorithm is an extension to the case of inattention of the standard heterogeneous agent
model with aggregate uncertainty and two assets, implemented by Krusell and Smith (1998),
Pijoan-Mas (2007) and Gomes and Michaelides (2008).
The numerical computation of heterogeneous agent model with aggregate uncertainty and
two assets is very cumbersome. The reason is twofold. First, one of the endogenous aggregate
state of the problem is the distribution of the agents over their idiosyncratic states γt, which
is an infinite-dimensional object. As noted by Krusell and Smith (1997), agents need to know
the entire distribution γt in order to generate rational expectations on prices. To circumvent
this insurmountable curse of dimensionality, the state space has to be somehow reduced. I
approximate the entire distribution γt by a set of moments m < ∞ of the stock of aggregate
capital Kt, as in Krusell and Smith (1997), and the number of inattentive agents in the economy
ζt. On the one hand, the approximation with a finite set of moments of K can be interpreted
as if the agents of the economy were bounded rational, ignoring higher-order moments of γt.
As in previous studies, I find that m = 1 is enough to have an almost perfect approximation
of γt. That is, the mean of aggregate capital K¯t is a sufficient statistics that capture virtually
all the information that agents need to forecast future prices. On the other hand, the variable
ζt signals agents about the degree of informational frictions in the economy. When every agent
is attentive, the model shrinks down to the standard Krusell and Smith (1998). Instead, when
there is a (non-negligible) measure of inattentive agent, which is the case at the core of my
analysis, the model departures from the standard setting. Since the presence of the observation
costs pins down different equilibria, and therefore different paths of futures prices, agents are
required to be aware of the extent of the informational frictions in the economy whenever taking
their optimal choices on consumption and savings.
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economy with more than one asset, the market for bonds does not clear at all dates and states:
the total bondholdings implied by the model is almost a random walk. Since total bondholdings
experience large movements over time, it is not always possible to achieve the clearing of the
market. I therefore follow the modified algorithm of Krusell and Smith (1998), where agents
perceive the bond return as a state of the economy. The equilibrium bond return is then the one
in which the bond return perceived by the agents and the one implied by the optimal decisions
of the agents coincide.
The presence of the observation cost adds a further complication. Agents have to decide
their optimal duration of inattention. This step requires the derivation of the household’s
maximization procedure not just in one case (i.e., today vs. the future), but in a much wider set
of alternatives. In the model households can decide whether to be attentive today and tomorrow,
whether to be attentive today and inattentive for the following period, or to be attentive today
and inattentive for the following two periods, and so on and so forth. Accordingly, I define
a grid over all the potential durations of inattention that agents can choose, solve the model
over each grid point, and eventually take the maximum among the different value functions to
derive the optimal choice of inattention.
The computation of the model requires the convergence upon six forecasting rules which
predict the future mean of the stock of aggregate capital, the future price of the bond, and the
future number of inattentive agents for both the aggregate shocks zb and zg. The procedure
yields a set of twenty-two different parameters upon which to converge. This algorithm is
very time-consuming and makes at the moment computationally infeasible any extension of the
model that inflates either the mechanisms or the number of states.
In what follows, I first describe the computational algorithm in Section A.1.1. Then, I
discuss the problem of the household given the forecasting rule on future prices in Section
A.1.2. Finally, Section A.1.3 concentrates on the derivation of the equilibrium forecasting rules.
I also show that the substitution of the entire distribution γt with the first moment of aggregate
Second, when extending the basic Krusell and Smith (1997) algorithm to the case of an
capital K¯t and the number of inattentive agents ζt yields an almost perfect approximation.
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A.1.1 Algorithm
The algorithm works around nine main steps, as follows:
1. Guess the set of moments mt of aggregate capital Kt upon which to approximate the
distribution of agents γt;
2. Guess the functional forms for the forecasting rule of the set of moments mt, the number
of inattentive agents in the economy ζt, and the bonds’ risk-free return r
b
t ;
3. Guess the parameters of the forecasting rules;
4. Solve the household’s problem;
5. Simulate the economy:
(a) Set an initial distribution of agents over their idiosyncratic states ω, e and ξ;
(b) Find the interest rate rb∗ that clears the market for bonds. Accordingly, guess an
initial condition rb,0, solve the household’s problem in which agents perceive the
bond return rb,0 as a state, and obtain the policy functions gc
(
ω, e, ξ; z,m, ζ, rb,0
)
,
gb
(
ω, e, ξ; z,m, ζ, rb,0
)
, ga
(
ω, e, ξ; z,m, ζ, rb,0
)
, gs
(
ω, e, ξ; z,m, ζ, rb,0
)
and
gd
(
ω, e, ξ; z,m, ζ, rb,0
)
. Use the policy functions on bondholdings gb to check whether
the market clears, that is, whether the total amount of bond equals zero. If there is
an excess of bond supply, then change the initial condition to rb,1 < rb,0. If there is
an excess of bond demand, then change the initial condition to rb,1 > rb,0. Iterate
until the convergence on the interest rate rb∗ that clears the market.
(c) Derive next period distribution of agents over their idiosyncratic states ω, e and ξ us-
ing the policy functions gc
(
ω, e, ξ; z,m, ζ, rb∗
)
, gb
(
ω, e, ξ; z,m, ζ, rb∗
)
, ga
(
ω, e, ξ; z,m, ζ, rb∗
)
,
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gs
(
ω, e, ξ; z,m, ζ, rb,0
)
and gd
(
ω, e, ξ; z,m, ζ, rb∗
)
and the law of motions for the
shocks z, e and ξ.
(d) Simulate the economy for a large number of periods T over a large measure of agents
N . Drop out the first observations which are likely to be influenced by the initial
conditions.
6. Use the simulated series to estimate the forecasting rules on mt, ζt and r
b
t implied by the
optimal decisions of the agents;
7. Check whether the coefficients of the forecasting rules implied by the optimal decisions
of the agents coincide with the one guessed in step (3). If they coincide, go to step (8).
Otherwise, go back to step (3);
8. Check whether the functional forms of the forecasting rule as chosen in step (2) give a
good fit of the approximation of the state space of the problem. If this is the case, go to
step (9). Otherwise, go back to step (2);
9. Check whether the set of momentsmk of aggregate capital K yields a good approximation
of the distribution of agents γ. If this is the case, the model is solved. Otherwise, go back
to step (1).
A.1.2 Household’s Problem
I solve the household’s problem using value function iteration techniques. I discretize the state
space of the problem as follows. First, I guess that the first moment of aggregate capital and the
number of inattention agents are sufficient statistics describing the evolution of the distribution
of agents γt. Later on, I evaluate the accuracy of my conjecture. Then, I follow Pijoan-Mas
(2007) by stacking all the shocks, both the idiosyncratic and the aggregate ones, in a single
vector t, which has 8 points: four points - one for unemployed agents and three different level
for employed agents - for each aggregate shock zt. For the wealth ωt I use a grid of 60 points
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on a logarithmic scale. Instead, for the possible durations of inattention dt, I use a grid of
30 points: the first 25 points are equidistant and goes from no inattention at all, 1 month
of inattention until 2 years of inattention. The following 5 grid points are equidistant on a
quarterly basis. In this respect, the assumption made in the model on when inattention breaks
out exogenously are very helpful in the definition of the grid. Indeed, agents will not choose
too long durations of inattention because they take into account the probability of being called
attentive because either they hit the borrowing constraints or they run out of liquid funds. For
example, in the benchmark model the largest point of the grid yields a duration of inattention
of 3 years. Yet, this choice is hardly picked up by households in the simulations done to solve
the model. Without the two assumptions on the exogenous ending of inattention, then some
households could theoretically be inattentive forever, which would require a wider grid for the
choice variable dt. Then, for the grids of the first moment of aggregate capital K¯t and the
number of inattentive agents ζt I use 6 points since the value function does not display a lot
of curvature along these dimensions. To sum up, any value functions is computed over a total
of 518,400 different grid points. Furthermore, I need to take into account that the solution
method requires the households to perceive the bond return as a state of the economy. I use a
grid for rbt formed by 10 points, which yields a total of 5,184,000 grid points. Decisions rules
off the grid are evaluated using a cubic spline interpolation around along the values of wealth
ωt and a bilinear interpolation around the remaining endogenous state variables. Finally, the
solution of the model is simulated on a set of 3,000 agents over T=10,000 time periods. In any
evaluation of the simulated series, the first 1,000 observations are dropped out.
The household’s problem used in step (4) of the algorithm modifies the standard structure
presented in the text to allow for the approximation of the measure of agents μt with the first
moment of aggregate capital K¯t and the number of inattentive agents ζt. Then, I postulate
three forecasting rules (R1 (·) , R2 (·) , R3 (·)) for aggregate capital Kt, the number of inattentive
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agents ζt and the return of the bond r
b
t , respectively. The household’s problem reads
V (ωt, et, ξt;Kt, ζt) = max
d, [c(et,ξt), c(eλ(d)−1,ξλ(d)−1)], at+1, st+1, bt+1
Et
[
λ(d)∑
j=t
βj−t U (cj) + . . .
· · ·+ βλ(d)−t V (ωλ(d), eλ(d), ξλ(d);Kλ(d), ζλ(d))
]
s.t. ωt = c (et, ξt) + at+1 + st+1 + bt+1 + φI{st+1 =0}
ωλ(d) = st+1
λ(d)∏
j=t+1
(
1 + rsj (Kj, ζj)
)
+ bt+1
λ(d)∏
j=t+1
(
1 + rbj (Kj, ζj)
)
+ . . .
· · ·+ at+1 +
λ(d)∑
j=t+1
lj (Kj, ζj)−
λ(d)−1∑
j=t+1
c (ej, ξj)− χlλ(d)
(
Kλ(d), ζλ(d)
)− λ(d)−1∑
j=t+2
φI{sj =0}
Kλ(d) = R1
(
Kt, ζt, [zt, zλ(d)]
)
ζλ(d) = R2
(
Kt, ζt, [zt, zλ(d)]
)
rbλ(d) = R3
(
Kt, ζt, [zt, zλ(d)]
)
st+1 ≥ s, bt+1 ≥ b, at+1 ≥ 0, c (et, ξt) ≥ 0
λ(d) = min
j∈[t+1,d]
{
d, bt+1
j∏
k=t+1
(
1 + rbk
)
< b, st+1
j∏
k=t+1
(1 + rsk) < s,
j∑
k=t+1
c (ek, ξk) > at+1 +
j∑
k=t+1
lk
}
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Instead, in step (5b) of the problem the households perceive the return of the bond rbt as a
state of the economy, as follows
V
(
ωt, et, ξt;Kt, ζt, r
b
t
)
= max
d, [c(et,ξt), c(eλ(d)−1,ξλ(d)−1)], at+1, st+1, bt+1
Et
[
λ(d)∑
j=t
βj−t U (cj) + . . .
· · ·+ βλ(d)−t V (ωλ(d), eλ(d), ξλ(d);Kλ(d), ζλ(d), rbλ(d))
]
s.t. ωt = c (et, ξt) + at+1 + st+1 + bt+1 + φI{st+1 =0}
ωλ(d) = st+1
λ(d)∏
j=t+1
(
1 + rsj
(
Kj, ζj, r
b
j
))
+ bt+1
λ(d)∏
j=t+1
(
1 + rbj
(
Kj, ζj, r
b
j
))
+ . . .
· · ·+ at+1 +
λ(d)∑
j=t+1
lj
(
Kj, ζj, r
b
j
)− λ(d)−1∑
j=t+1
c (ej, ξj)− χlλ(d)
(
Kλ(d), ζλ(d), r
b
λ(d),
)− λ(d)−1∑
j=t+2
φI{sj =0}
Kλ(d) = R1
(
Kt, ζt, [zt, zλ(d)]
)
ζλ(d) = R2
(
Kt, ζt, [zt, zλ(d)]
)
rbλ(d) = R3
(
Kt, ζt, [zt, zλ(d)]
)
st+1 ≥ s, bt+1 ≥ b, at+1 ≥ 0, c (et, ξt) ≥ 0
λ(d) = min
j∈[t+1,d]
{
d, bt+1
j∏
k=t+1
(
1 + rbk
)
< b, st+1
j∏
k=t+1
(1 + rsk) < s, . . .
. . .
j∑
k=t+1
c (ek, ξk) > at+1 +
j∑
k=t+1
lk
}
I use this problem to simulate the economy given the return to the bond rbt as a perceived
state for the households. I follow Gomes and Michaelides (2008) by aggregating agents’ bond
demands and determining the bond return that clears the market through linear interpolation.
This value is then used to recover the implied optimal decisions of the agents, which are then
aggregated to form the aggregate variables that become that state variables in the following
time period.
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Furthermore, I have to define the parametric form that let the choices of consumption
throughout inattention depend on the realizations of the idiosyncratic shocks et and ξt. Namely,
I posit that c (et, ξt) = ρ1 ∗ (1− et) + ρ2etξt. In this way, ρ1 captures the absolute amount that
an unemployed household consumes, whereas ρ2 determines how consumption changes as a
function of the shock to the efficiency unit of hours that employed households experience.
A.1.3 Equilibrium Forecasting Rules
I follow Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998) by defining log-linear functional forms for the forecasting
rules of the mean of aggregate stock capital K¯t, the number of inattentive agents ζt and the
bond return rbt . Namely, I use the following law of motions:
log K¯ = α0(z) + α1(z) log K¯ + α2(z) log ζ
log ζ = β0(z) + β1(z) log K¯ + β2(z) log ζ
rb = γ0(z) + γ1(z) log K¯ + γ2(z) log ζ + γ3(z)
(
log K¯
)2
+ γ4(z) (log ζ)
2
The parameters of the functional forms depend on the aggregate shock zt. Indeed, there is a
set of three forecasting rule for each of the two realizations of the aggregate shock t, resulting
in a total of six forecasting rules and twenty-two parameters, upon which to find convergence.
I find the equilibrium forecasting rules as follows. First, I guess a set of initial condi-
tions {α00(z), α01(z), α02(z), β00(z), β01(z), β02(z), γ00(z), γ01(z), γ02(z), γ03(z), γ04(z)}. Then, given such
rules I solve the household’s problem. I take the simulated series to then re-estimate the fore-
casting rules, which yields a new set of implied parameters
{
α10(z), α
1
1(z), α
1
2(z), β
1
0(z), β
1
1(z),
β12(z), γ
1
0(z), γ
1
1(z), γ
1
2(z), γ
1
3(z), γ
1
4(z)
}
. If the two sets coincide (up to a numerical wedge), then
these values correspond to the equilibrium forecasting rules. Otherwise, I use the latter set of
coefficients as a new initial guess.
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rules for zt = zg
log K¯ = 0.130 + 0.976 log K¯ − 0.251 log ζ with R2 = 0.993482
log ζ = −0.206 + 0.039 log K¯ + 0.881 log ζ with R2 = 0.995397
rb = 1.042− 0.073 log K¯ + 0.012 log ζ+
+ 0.010
(
log K¯
)2
+ 0.005 (log ζ)2 with R2 = 0.998526
and the following equilibrium forecasting rules for zt = zb
log K¯ = 0.089 + 0.981 log K¯ − 0.240 log ζ with R2 = 0.994102
log ζ = −0.214 + 0.043 log K¯ + 0.840 log ζ with R2 = 0.997249
rb = 1.036− 0.073 log K¯ + 0.024 log ζ+
+ 0.008
(
log K¯
)2
+ 0.008 (log ζ)2 with R2 = 0.998388
Note that the R2 are all above 0.99. This result points out that approximating the distribution
of agents γt with the first moment of aggregate capital K¯t and the number of inattentive agents
ζt implies basically no discharge of relevant information that agents can use to forecast future
prices.
A.2 Further Results
A.2.1 An Alternative Model of Inattention
How do the results of the model change if inattentive agents can change their portfolio choices?
I address this question by comparing the benchmark economy, in which the consumption of
inattentive households depends on the realization of the idiosyncratic shocks, to a counterfactual
economy, in which both consumption and the holdings of bonds and stocks of inattentive
For the benchmark specification of the model, I find the following equilibrium forecasting
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households depend on the realization of the idiosyncratic shocks. More precisely, I consider an
environment which is exactly similar to the benchmark economy, with the only difference that
throughout inattention the portfolio choices partially change as a function of the realizations
of the idiosyncratic shocks. In this new version of the model, although inattentive households
are not aware of the amount of their financial portfolio, they blindly decide to partially change
it.1
In particular, I let the policy function of the portfolio choices throughout inattention to
be defined as follows: for any t ∈ N : di < t < di+1, s(et, ξt) = [ρs1(1− et) + ρs2etξt] ρsωωdi
and b(et, ξt) =
[
ρb1(1− et) + ρb2etξt
]
ρbωωdi . This specification posits that the optimal portfolio
choices move throughout inattention following the realizations of the idiosyncratic shocks et and
ξt, and also depend on the value of households’ wealth at the last planning date ωdi . This last
condition follows the idea that households set their choices looking at the level of their wealth,
and the best prediction they can have of the evolution of their wealth during inattention is
given by the observation of their wealth they made at the last planning date.
Table ?? compares some implications of the benchmark model with those of the counter-
factual economy. The Table shows that the counterfactual economy leads to a lower amount of
rebalancing inertia, since households can now actively offset around 84% of the passive change
in the risky share of their portfolio. Also the equity premium shrinks, from 2.64% to 1.83%. In
addition, the model requires a much higher participation cost to match the observed amount
of limited stock market participation.
Although I acknowledge that my modeling of inattention leads to a larger portfolio inertia
and equity premium than the counterfactual economy considered in this Section, the underlying
assumptions of the benchmark model are more consistent with the data. Indeed, Alvarez et al.
(2012) find that in the data only 6% of households adjust their portfolio more often than they
1I assume that the liquid transaction account clears the movements in stocks and bonds throughout inat-
tention, i.e., an inattentive household uses funds from the transaction account to increase its holdings of bonds
and stocks, and vice versa.
A.1
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observe it (i.e, almost no investor blindly changes the composition of its financial portfolio).
Thus, a model of inattention should be able to account for this fact, by reproducing a pattern
in which inattentive households do not modify their portfolios.
Table A.1: An Alternative Model of Inattention
Variable Benchmark Counterfactual Economy
Per-Period Participation Cost 0.8% 1.5%
(in terms of avg. monthly labor income)
ψˆ (Passive Change) −0.730 −0.844
Equity premium 2.64 1.83
Note: In the “Benchmark” model, the consumption choices of inattentive households
change as a function of the realizations of the idiosyncratic shocks. In the “Counterfac-
tual Economy”, I consider an environment in which the choices of consumption, bonds,
and stocks of inattentive households change as a function of the realizations of the id-
iosyncratic shocks.
A.2.2 The Role of the Endogeneity of Inattention
How do the results of the model change if inattention is exogenous? I address this question
by comparing the benchmark economy, in which households face an observation cost and inat-
tention is endogenously determined, with a counterfactual environment, in which inattention is
exogenous. More precisely, I consider an environment which is exactly similar to the benchmark
economy, with the only difference that inattention is exogenous. I discipline the comparison by
calibrating the amount of exogenous inattention to match exactly the cross-sectional distribu-
tion of the duration of inattention generated by the benchmark economy. In this way, the only
difference between the two models is given by whether inattention is considered as either an
exogenous variable or an endogenous one.
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the model with exogenous inattention. The Table shows that an exogenous inattention requires
a lower participation cost to match the observed amount of limited stock market participation.
Importantly, an exogenous inattention raises both the lumpiness of portfolio rebalancing - the
active rebalancing goes from 73% down to 61% - and also the equity premium, which goes from
2.64% to 3.20%.
Intuitively, when inattention is endogenous, households can choose optimally when to ob-
serve the aggregate states of the economy. As a result, households have yet another choice
for smoothing their consumption stream, which leads to a more frequent rebalancing of their
portfolio, and to a lower price of risk.
These results suggest that the endogeneity of inattention could partially explain why the
benchmark economy falls shorter in accounting for asset prices when compared to other models
that consider inattention, such as Chien et al. (2011, 2012). From this point of view, the
endogeneity of inattention poses further quantitative challenges to any model that aims at
matching both the level and the dynamics of asset prices.
Table A.2: Endogenous vs. Exogenous Inattention
Variable Benchmark Exogenous Inattention
Per-Period Participation Cost 0.8% 0.5%
(in terms of avg. monthly labor income)
ψˆ (Passive Change) −0.730 −0.611
Equity premium 2.64 3.20
Note: In the “Benchmark” model, inattention is endogenous because households face an
observation cost. In the “Exogenous Inattention” model I consider an environment which
is completely similar to the “Benchmark” model with the only difference that inattention
is exogenous. I calibrate the amount of exogenous inattention to match exactly the cross-
sectional distribution of the duration of inattention generated by the “Benchmark” model.
Table ?? compares some implications of the benchmark economy with those recovered fromA.2
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 64 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1633
References
Alvarez, F., L. Guiso, and F. Lippi. 2012. Durable Consumption and Asset Management
with Transaction and Observation Costs. American Economic Review, 102, 2272-2300.
Chien, Y., H. Cole, and H. Lustig. 2011. A Multiplier Approach to Understanding the
Macro Implications of Household Finance. Review of Economic Studies, 78, 199-234.
Chien, Y., H. Cole, and H. Lustig. 2012. Is the Volatility of the Market Price of Risk due
to Intermittent Portfolio Re-Balancing? American Economic Review, 102, 2859-2896.
Gomes, F., and A. Michaelides. 2008. Asset Pricing with Limited Risk Sharing and
Heterogeneous Agents. Review of Financial Studies, 21, 415-448.
Krusell, P. and A. Smith. 1997. Income and Wealth Heterogeneity, Portfolio Choice, and
Equilibrium Asset Returns. Macroeconomics Dynamics, 1, 387-422.
Krusell, P., and A. Smith. 1998. Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the Macroeconomy.
Journal of Political Economy, 106, 867-896.
Pijoan-Mas, J. 2007. Pricing Risk in Economies with Heterogeneous Agents and Incomplete
Markets. Journal of the European Economic Association, 5, 987-1015.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS 
WORKING PAPERS  
1514  ALFREDO IBÁÑEZ: Default near-the-default-point: the value of and the distance to default.
1515  IVÁN KATARYNIUK and JAVIER VALLÉS: Fiscal consolidation after the Great Recession: the role of composition.
1516  PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS and ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: On the predictability of narrative fi scal adjustments.
1517  GALO NUÑO and CARLOS THOMAS: Monetary policy and sovereign debt vulnerability.
1518  CRISTIANA BELU MANESCU and GALO NUÑO: Quantitative effects of the shale oil revolution.
1519  YAEL V. HOCHBERG, CARLOS J. SERRANO and ROSEMARIE H. ZIEDONIS: Patent collateral, investor commitment 
and the market for venture lending.
1520  TRINO-MANUEL ÑÍGUEZ, IVAN PAYA, DAVID PEEL and JAVIER PEROTE: Higher-order risk preferences, constant 
relative risk aversion and the optimal portfolio allocation.
1521  LILIANA ROJAS-SUÁREZ and JOSÉ MARÍA SERENA: Changes in funding patterns by Latin American banking systems:  
how large? how risky?
1522  JUAN F. JIMENO: Long-lasting consequences of the European crisis.
1523  MAXIMO CAMACHO, DANILO LEIVA-LEON and GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIROS: Country shocks, monetary policy 
expectations and ECB decisions. A dynamic non-linear approach.
1524  JOSÉ MARÍA SERENA GARRALDA and GARIMA VASISHTHA: What drives bank-intermediated trade fi nance? 
Evidence from cross-country analysis.
1525  GABRIELE FIORENTINI, ALESSANDRO GALESI and ENRIQUE SENTANA: Fast ML estimation of dynamic bifactor 
models: an application to European infl ation.
1526  YUNUS AKSOY and HENRIQUE S. BASSO: Securitization and asset prices.
1527  MARÍA DOLORES GADEA, ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS and GABRIEL PEREZ-QUIROS: The Great Moderation in historical 
perspective. Is it that great?
1528  YUNUS AKSOY, HENRIQUE S. BASSO, RON P. SMITH and TOBIAS GRASL: Demographic structure and 
macroeconomic trends.
1529  JOSÉ MARÍA CASADO, CRISTINA FERNÁNDEZ and JUAN F. JIMENO: Worker fl ows in the European Union during 
the Great Recession.
1530  CRISTINA FERNÁNDEZ and PILAR GARCÍA PEREA: The impact of the euro on euro area GDP per capita. 
1531  IRMA ALONSO ÁLVAREZ: Institutional drivers of capital fl ows.
1532  PAUL EHLING, MICHAEL GALLMEYER, CHRISTIAN HEYERDAHL-LARSEN and PHILIPP ILLEDITSCH: Disagreement 
about infl ation and the yield curve.
1533  GALO NUÑO and BENJAMIN MOLL: Controlling a distribution of heterogeneous agents.
1534  TITO BOERI and JUAN F. JIMENO: The unbearable divergence of unemployment in Europe.
1535  OLYMPIA BOVER: Measuring expectations from household surveys: new results on subjective probabilities of future 
house prices.
1536  CRISTINA FERNÁNDEZ, AITOR LACUESTA, JOSÉ MANUEL MONTERO and ALBERTO URTASUN: Heterogeneity 
of markups at the fi rm level and changes during the great recession: the case of Spain.
1537  MIGUEL SARMIENTO and JORGE E. GALÁN: The infl uence of risk-taking on bank effi ciency: evidence from Colombia.
1538  ISABEL ARGIMÓN, MICHEL DIETSCH and ÁNGEL ESTRADA: Prudential fi lters, portfolio composition and capital ratios 
in European banks.
1539  MARIA M. CAMPOS, DOMENICO DEPALO, EVANGELIA PAPAPETROU, JAVIER J. PÉREZ and ROBERTO RAMOS: 
Understanding the public sector pay gap.
1540  ÓSCAR ARCE, SAMUEL HURTADO and CARLOS THOMAS: Policy spillovers and synergies in a monetary union.
1601  CHRISTIAN CASTRO, ÁNGEL ESTRADA and JORGE MARTÍNEZ: The countercyclical capital buffer in Spain: 
an analysis of key guiding indicators.
1602  TRINO-MANUEL ÑÍGUEZ and JAVIER PEROTE: Multivariate moments expansion density: application of the dynamic 
equicorrelation model.
1603  ALBERTO FUERTES and JOSÉ MARÍA SERENA: How fi rms borrow in international bond markets: securities regulation 
and market segmentation.
1604  ENRIQUE ALBEROLA, IVÁN KATARYNIUK, ÁNGEL MELGUIZO and RENÉ OROZCO: Fiscal policy and the cycle 
in Latin America: the role of fi nancing conditions and fi scal rules.
1605  ANA LAMO, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO and JAVIER J. PÉREZ: Does slack infl uence public and private labour 
market interactions?
1606  FRUCTUOSO BORRALLO, IGNACIO HERNANDO and JAVIER VALLÉS: The effects of US unconventional monetary 
policies in Latin America.
1607  VINCENZO MERELLA and DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA: Do the rich (really) consume higher-quality goods? Evidence from 
international trade data.
1608  CARMEN BROTO and MATÍAS LAMAS: Measuring market liquidity in US fi xed income markets: a new synthetic 
indicator.
1609  MANUEL GARCÍA-SANTANA, ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO, JOSEP PIJOAN-MAS and ROBERTO RAMOS: Growing like 
Spain: 1995-2007.
1610  MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA and RAQUEL VEGAS: Las reformas de la Ley Concursal durante la Gran Recesión.
1611  LUNA AZAHARA ROMO GONZÁLEZ: The drivers of European banks’ US dollar debt issuance: opportunistic funding 
in times of crisis?
1612  CELESTINO GIRÓN, MARTA MORANO, ENRIQUE M. QUILIS, DANIEL SANTABÁRBARA and CARLOS TORREGROSA: 
Modelling interest payments for macroeconomic assessment.
1613  ENRIQUE MORAL-BENITO: Growing by learning: fi rm-level evidence on the size-productivity nexus.
1614  JAIME MARTÍNEZ-MARTÍN: Breaking down world trade elasticities: a panel ECM approach.
1615  ALESSANDRO GALESI and OMAR RACHEDI: Structural transformation, services deepening, and the transmission 
of monetary policy.
1616  BING XU, ADRIAN VAN RIXTEL and HONGLIN WANG: Do banks extract informational rents through collateral?
1617  MIHÁLY TAMÁS BORSI: Credit contractions and unemployment.
1618  MIHÁLY TAMÁS BORSI: Fiscal multipliers across the credit cycle.
1619  GABRIELE FIORENTINI, ALESSANDRO GALESI and ENRIQUE SENTANA: A spectral EM algorithm for dynamic 
factor models.
1620  FRANCISCO MARTÍ and JAVIER J. PÉREZ: Spanish public fi nances through the fi nancial crisis.
1621  ADRIAN VAN RIXTEL, LUNA ROMO GONZÁLEZ and JING YANG: The determinants of long-term debt issuance by 
European banks: evidence of two crises.
1622  JAVIER ANDRÉS, ÓSCAR ARCE and CARLOS THOMAS: When fi scal consolidation meets private deleveraging.
1623  CARLOS SANZ: The effect of electoral systems on voter turnout: evidence from a natural experiment.
1624  GALO NUÑO and CARLOS THOMAS: Optimal monetary policy with heterogeneous agents.
1625  MARÍA DOLORES GADEA, ANA GÓMEZ-LOSCOS and ANTONIO MONTAÑÉS: Oil price and economic growth: 
a long story?
1626  PAUL DE GRAUWE and EDDIE GERBA: Stock market cycles and supply side dynamics: two worlds, one vision?
1627 RICARDO GIMENO and EVA ORTEGA: The evolution of infl ation expectations in euro area markets.
1628 SUSANA PÁRRAGA RODRÍGUEZ: The dynamic effect of public expenditure shocks in the United States.
1629 SUSANA PÁRRAGA RODRÍGUEZ: The aggregate effects of government incometransfer shocks - EU evidence.
1630  JUAN S. MORA-SANGUINETTI, MARTA MARTÍNEZ-MATUTE and MIGUEL GARCÍA-POSADA: Credit, crisis 
and contract enforcement: evidence from the Spanish loan market.
1631  PABLO BURRIEL and ALESSANDRO GALESI: Uncovering the heterogeneous effects of ECB unconventional 
monetary policies across euro area countries.
1632  MAR DELGADO TÉLLEZ, VÍCTOR D. LLEDÓ and JAVIER J. PÉREZ: On the determinants of fi scal non-compliance: 
an empirical analysis of Spain’s regions.
1633  OMAR RACHEDI: Portfolio rebalancing and asset pricing with heterogeneous inattention.
Unidad de Servicios Auxiliares
Alcalá, 48 - 28014 Madrid
E-mail: publicaciones@bde.es
www.bde.es
